...cal
"May I wear your shoes?" he asked me.
"But why", was my reply?
"Do you wear your brother's boxers, the ones he found in your room?"
"Do you have your own, the ones with Batman that say boom?"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nKrhh4h78E&feature=related
"Do you consider yourself weak or is it just a fad?"
"Please wear my shoes," I whispered to my friend. (mans foot x-ray at TSA ;)
Walk barefoot with me in my world, live calmly with me in my life..... seek
Peace as we inhale wonder and love openly till the end.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mzpVo_1qfDc&feature=fvwrel (Class Project: ONE Day Without Shoes 7.5.11)
Hope is on the horizon
and if u hold me gently, we will prevail.
Love to you sweet friend!!! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLLLszBWAhQ&feature=related (Footprints in the sand)
We Shock and Awed Em!
...cal
We walked to the crop duster http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jWufkTHbj8
and he opened up the door.
I stacked the leaflets http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/korea-12092008081506.html
High... and Neatly on the floor. http://www.psywarrior.com/HerbDStorm.html
Leaflets of Operation Desert Shield
and Desert Storm
I saw the coppers coming
And I gently hit the ground.
The baby inside kicked me http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Elx8nUWZ63w&feature=related
The new hope we all had found
The coppers called the firemen
And the trucks arrived with sound http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4APBvMmKubU
There see now a note is tacked
quite securely on the door http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1h_lirX_alo Hope for Haiti:The Pink Door Photographs - London...an exhibition (HD)
It says we shocked and awed em -
The dusters all were flying
on the scheduled day at noon
And the people all rejoiced
as we sang a happy tune. (and we danced)
Party Rock Anthemhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQ6zr6kCPj8
- that's a given - in this land
and if you see a duster
flying low and kickin' sand. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWEZ0SEGyZ0&feature=related
You'll know we're getting restless,
us, the Natives of this land http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQ3XUM9gUG4 Runing Bear
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ojRQ15My7s&feature=fvwrel Cherokee Nation
Let's hoist us up some leaflets
Now it's time for us again
Go stir you up some pilots http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpbToI72xkg (IVAW)
http://www.warriorswatch.org/
for Syria or IRAN.
So off to your place of fun
and talk to those boys that fly
You must have a friend or two
with some mischief in his eye. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8S_93-yV094
Go before they rein us in
and have fun like little boys.
Take lots of papers filled with
info - clutter up that town
Go litter on the sidewalk
take the power from the crown. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mo7XSFuApLg&feature=related (The Crown Total Satan)
That day we shocked and awed em,
the top masters were all mad (metallica master of puppets lyrics)
http://www.lyrics.com/master-of-puppets-lyrics-metallica.html
We were there to have our way
and WE weren't being bad.
the unheard internet crowd
And when the papers hit the streets
then the others too were loud.
We worked, we marched, not seen at all http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15780321
( NY Occupy movement attempts to march on stock exchange)
Till the pilots took that step
Well, that was years ago and the leaflets did the trick
Now, the Bushes are in history like the one called Tricky Dick.
> http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/
Electronic Briefing
Books Main Index
Read the press release
More Archive Resources on Iraq and the Middle East
Iraqgate: Saddam Hussein, U.S. Policy and the Prelude to the Persian
Gulf War, 1980-1994
U.S. Propaganda in the Middle East - The Early Cold War Version
Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Operation Desert Storm: Ten Years After
Shaking Hands: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein greets Donald
Rumsfeld, then special envoy of President Ronald Reagan, in Baghdad
on December 20, 1983.
Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein:
The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82
Edited by Joyce Battle
February 25, 2003
Print this page Jump to documents
Washington Post "Live Online" chat with Archive Middle East Analyst
Joyce Battle, "Iraq: Declassified Documents of U.S. Support for
Hussein," February 27, 2003
Video Clip: "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein," Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein greets Donald Rumsfeld, then special envoy of
President Ronald Reagan, in Baghdad on December 20, 1983. [Windows
Media Video (WMV). Opens in Windows Media Player] (Iraqi television;
courtesy CNN)
High Resolution (2.54 MB) Low Resolution (734 KB)
The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was one of a series of crises during an
era of upheaval in the Middle East: revolution in Iran, occupation of
the U.S. embassy in Tehran by militant students, invasion of the
Great Mosque in Mecca by anti-royalist Islamicists, the Soviet
Union's occupation of Afghanistan, and internecine fighting among
Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians in Lebanon. The war followed
months of rising tension between the Iranian Islamic republic and
secular nationalist Iraq. In mid-September 1980 Iraq attacked, in the
mistaken belief that Iranian political disarray would guarantee a
quick victory.
The international community responded with U.N. Security Council
resolutions calling for a ceasefire and for all member states to
refrain from actions contributing in any way to the conflict's
continuation. The Soviets, opposing the war, cut off arms exports to
Iran and to Iraq, its ally under a 1972 treaty (arms deliveries
resumed in 1982). The U.S. had already ended, when the shah fell,
previously massive military sales to Iran. In 1980 the U.S. broke off
diplomatic relations with Iran because of the Tehran embassy hostage
crisis; Iraq had broken off ties with the U.S. during the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war.
The U.S. was officially neutral regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and
claimed that it armed neither side. Iran depended on U.S.-origin
weapons, however, and sought them from Israel, Europe, Asia, and
South America. Iraq started the war with a large Soviet-supplied
arsenal, but needed additional weaponry as the conflict wore on.
Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian territory, but was driven
back within months. By mid-1982, Iraq was on the defensive against
Iranian human-wave attacks. The U.S., having decided that an Iranian
victory would not serve its interests, began supporting Iraq:
measures already underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq relations were
accelerated, high-level officials exchanged visits, and in February
1982 the State Department removed Iraq from its list of states
supporting international terrorism. (It had been included several
years earlier because of ties with several Palestinian nationalist
groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda. Activism
by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group, al-Dawa, was a
major factor precipitating the war -- stirred by Iran's Islamic
revolution, its endeavors included the attempted assassination of
Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)
Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. Iraq received massive
external financial support from the Gulf states, and assistance
through loan programs from the U.S. The White House and State
Department pressured the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with
financing, to enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain
loans from other international financial institutions. The U.S.
Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans for
purchases of American commodities, to the satisfaction of U.S. grain
exporters.
The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November 1984, but
the U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to provide it with
intelligence and military support (in secret and contrary to this
country's official neutrality) in accordance with policy directives
from President Ronald Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to his
March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82) asking for
a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.
One of these directives from Reagan, National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983, is available only in a
highly redacted version [Document 21]. It reviews U.S. regional
interests in the Middle East and South Asia, and U.S. objectives,
including peace between Israel and the Arabs, resolution of other
regional conflicts, and economic and military improvements, "to
strengthen regional stability." It deals with threats to the U.S.,
strategic planning, cooperation with other countries, including the
Arab states, and plans for action. An interdepartmental review of the
implications of shifting policy in favor of Iraq was conducted
following promulgation of the directive.
By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting Iraqi use of using
chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva protocol requires that the
international community respond to chemical warfare, but a
diplomatically isolated Iran received only a muted response to its
complaints [Note 1]. It intensified its accusations in October 1983,
however, and in November asked for a United Nations Security Council
investigation.
The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq war with
extraordinary intensity, had intelligence confirming Iran's
accusations, and describing Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical
weapons, concurrent with its policy review and decision to support
Iraq in the war [Document 24]. The intelligence indicated that Iraq
used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and, according to a
November 1983 memo, against "Kurdish insurgents" as well [Document
25].
What was the Reagan administration's response? A State Department
account indicates that the administration had decided to limit
its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring because
of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources,
and the low probability of achieving desired results." But the
department noted in late November 1983 that "with the essential
assistance of foreign firms, Iraq ha[d] become able to deploy and use
CW and probably has built up large reserves of CW for further use.
Given its desperation to end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or
incapacitating CW, particularly if Iran threatens to break through
Iraqi lines in a large-scale attack" [Document 25]. The State
Department argued that the U.S. needed to respond in some way to
maintain the credibility of its official opposition to chemical
warfare, and recommended that the National Security Council discuss
the issue.
Following further high-level policy review, Ronald Reagan issued
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, dated November 26,
1983, concerned specifically with U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq
war. The directive reflects the administration's priorities: it calls
for heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil
facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the
Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries of state and defense and
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take appropriate
measures to respond to tensions in the area. It states, "Because of
the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil
from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must
assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at
disrupting that traffic." It does not mention chemical weapons
[Document 26].
Soon thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who had served in various positions
in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including as President Ford's
defense secretary, and at this time headed the multinational
pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle & Co.) was dispatched to the
Middle East as a presidential envoy. His December 1983 tour of
regional capitals included Baghdad, where he was to establish "direct
contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam
Hussein," while emphasizing "his close relationship" with the
president [Document 28]. Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two
discussed regional issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward
Iran and Syria, and the U.S.'s efforts to find alternative routes to
transport Iraq's oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been
shut down by Iran, and Iran's ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline
that transported Iraqi oil through its territory. Rumsfeld made no
reference to chemical weapons, according to detailed notes on the
meeting [Document 31].
Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and the two
agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests." Rumsfeld
affirmed the Reagan administration's "willingness to do more"
regarding the Iran-Iraq war, but "made clear that our efforts to
assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for
us, citing the use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the
Gulf, and human rights." He then moved on to other U.S. concerns
[Document 32]. Later, Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests
section that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely pleased" with the
visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise
Rumsfeld as a person" [Document 36 and Document 37].
Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March 1984. By this time, the
U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical weapons use,
stating, "The United States has concluded that the available evidence
substantiates Iran's charges that Iraq used chemical weapons"
[Document 47]. Briefings for Rumsfeld's meetings noted that
atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since his December visit
because of Iraqi military reverses and because "bilateral relations
were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use,
despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or
later" [Document 48]. Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi officials
the Reagan administration's hope that it could obtain Export-Import
Bank credits for Iraq, the Aqaba pipeline, and its vigorous efforts
to cut off arms exports to Iran. According to an affidavit prepared
by one of Rumsfeld's companions during his Mideast travels, former
NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also conveyed to Iraq an
offer from Israel to provide assistance, which was rejected [Document
61].
Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of U.S.
military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided on a "don't
ask - don't tell" basis. In April 1984, the Baghdad interests section
asked to be kept apprised of Bell Helicopter Textron's negotiations
to sell helicopters to Iraq, which were not to be "in any way
configured for military use" [Document 55]. The purchaser was the
Iraqi Ministry of Defense. In December 1982, Bell Textron's Italian
subsidiary had informed the U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned down
a request from Iraq to militarize recently purchased Hughes
helicopters. An allied government, South Korea, informed the State
Department that it had received a similar request in June 1983 (when
a congressional aide asked in March 1983 whether heavy trucks
recently sold to Iraq were intended for military purposes, a State
Department official replied "we presumed that this was Iraq's
intention, and had not asked.") [Document 44]
During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered policy for the sale
of dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear program, and its "preliminary
results favor[ed] expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear
entities" [Document 57]. Several months later, a Defense Intelligence
Agency analysis said that even after the war ended, Iraq was likely
to "continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical
capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons" [Document 58]. (Iraq
is situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and Israel had stockpiled a
large nuclear weapons arsenal without international censure. Nuclear
nonproliferation was not a high priority of the Reagan
administration - throughout the 1980s it downplayed Pakistan's
nuclear program, though its intelligence indicated that a weapons
capability was being pursued, in order to avert congressionally
mandated sanctions. Sanctions would have impeded the administration's
massive military assistance to Pakistan provided in return for its
support of the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan.)
In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting a major Iranian attack,
issued a warning that "the invaders should know that for every
harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it
whatever the number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide"
[Document 41]. On March 3, the State Department intervened to prevent
a U.S. company from shipping 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a
chemical weapons precursor, to Iraq. Washington instructed the U.S.
interests section to protest to the Iraqi government, and to inform
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "we anticipate making a public
condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the near future,"
and that "we are adamantly opposed to Iraq's attempting to acquire
the raw materials, equipment, or expertise to manufacture chemical
weapons from the United States. When we become aware of attempts to
do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq" [Document 42].
The public condemnation was issued on March 5. It said, "While
condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . The United States finds
the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its
avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of
neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of
behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it
claims" [Document 43].
Later in the month, the State Department briefed the press on its
decision to strengthen controls on the export of chemical weapons
precursors to Iran and Iraq, in response to intelligence and media
reports that precursors supplied to Iraq originated in Western
countries. When asked whether the U.S.'s conclusion that Iraq had
used chemical weapons would have "any effect on U.S. recent
initiatives to expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a
broad range, and also a willingness to open diplomatic relations,"
the department's spokesperson said "No. I'm not aware of any change
in our position. We're interested in being involved in a closer
dialogue with Iraq" [Document 52].
Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the U.N. to condemn
Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. delegate to the U.N. was
instructed to lobby friendly delegations in order to obtain a general
motion of "no decision" on the resolution. If this was not
achievable, the U.S. delegate was to abstain on the issue. Iraq's
ambassador met with the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Jeane
Kirkpatrick, and asked for "restraint" in responding to the issue -
as did the representatives of both France and Britain.
A senior U.N. official who had participated in a fact-finding mission
to investigate Iran's complaint commented "Iranians may well decide
to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if [the]
international community does not condemn Iraq. He said Iranian
assembly speaker Rafsanjani [had] made public statements to this
effect" [Document 50].
Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon met with Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State James Placke on March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq
strongly preferred a Security Council presidential statement to a
resolution, and wanted the response to refer to former resolutions on
the war, progress toward ending the conflict, but to not identify any
specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke said
the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals if the Security Council went
along. He asked for the Iraqi government's help "in avoiding . . .
embarrassing situation[s]" but also noted that the U.S. did "not want
this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship" [Document 54].
On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a presidential
statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq
as the offending party. A State Department memo circulating the draft
text observed that, "The statement, by the way contains all three
elements Hamdoon wanted" [Document 51].
On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued another presidential directive
(NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S. objective of ensuring access to
military facilities in the Gulf region, and instructing the director
of central intelligence and the secretary of defense to upgrade U.S.
intelligence gathering capabilities. It codified U.S. determination
to develop plans "to avert an Iraqi collapse." Reagan's directive
said that U.S. policy required "unambiguous" condemnation of chemical
warfare (without naming Iraq), while including the caveat that the
U.S. should "place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran
from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have
characterized recent offensives." The directive does not suggest
that "condemning" chemical warfare required any hesitation about or
modification of U.S. support for Iraq [Document 53].
A State Department background paper dated November 16, 1984 said that
Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons after a November 1983
demarche from the U.S., but had resumed their use in February 1984.
On November 26, 1984, Iraq and the U.S. restored diplomatic
relations. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, in Washington for the
formal resumption of ties, met with Secretary of State George Shultz.
When their discussion turned to the Iran-Iraq war, Aziz said that his
country was satisfied that "the U.S. analysis of the war's threat to
regional stability is 'in agreement in principle' with Iraq's," and
expressed thanks for U.S. efforts to cut off international arms sales
to Iran. He said that "Iraq's superiority in weaponry" assured Iraq's
defense. Shultz, with presumed sardonic intent, "remarked that
superior intelligence must also be an important factor in Iraq's
defense;" Tariq Aziz had to agree [Document 60].
Conclusion
The current Bush administration discusses Iraq in starkly moralistic
terms to further its goal of persuading a skeptical world that a
preemptive and premeditated attack on Iraq could and should be
supported as a "just war." The documents included in this briefing
book reflect the realpolitik that determined this country's policies
during the years when Iraq was actually employing chemical weapons.
Actual rather than rhetorical opposition to such use was evidently
not perceived to serve U.S. interests; instead, the Reagan
administration did not deviate from its determination that Iraq was
to serve as the instrument to prevent an Iranian victory. Chemical
warfare was viewed as a potentially embarrassing public relations
problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance. The Iraqi
government's repressive internal policies, though well known to the
U.S. government at the time, did not figure at all in the
presidential directives that established U.S. policy toward the Iran-
Iraq war. The U.S. was concerned with its ability to project military
force in the Middle East, and to keep the oil flowing.
Most of the information in this briefing book, in its broad outlines,
has been available for years. Some of it was recorded in
contemporaneous news reports; a few investigative reporters uncovered
much more - especially after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A particular
debt is owed to the late representative Henry Gonzales (1916-2000),
Democrat of Texas, whose staff extensively investigated U.S. policy
toward Iraq during the 1980s and who would not be deterred from
making information available to the public [Note 2]. Almost all of
the primary documents included in this briefing book were obtained by
the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act
and were published in 1995 [Note 3].
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader
to view.
Document 1: United States Embassy in Turkey Cable from Richard W.
Boehm to the Department of State. "Back Up of Transshipment Cargos
for Iraq," November 21, 1980.
Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. embassy in
Ankara reports that Turkish ports have a backlog of goods awaiting
transshipment to Iraq, and that a substantial amount of Israeli goods
transit Turkey for "Islamic belligerents," including Israeli chemical
products for Iran. It remarks on "Israeli acumen" in selling to both
Iran and Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq war was a tragedy for Iraqis and Iranians, resulting in
hundreds of thousands of casualties and immense material damage. It
was sustained by an arms bazaar made up of a broad spectrum of
foreign governments and corporations: British, Spanish, Italian,
French, German, Brazilian, Argentinean, Chilean, North Korean,
Chinese, South African, Eastern European, Israeli, American, etc.,
who found both combatants eager consumers of weapons, ammunition, and
military technology. Iran needed U.S.-origin weapons compatible with
the military infrastructure created by the U.S. during the shah's
reign, could not buy them directly, and had to rely on third-party
suppliers like Israel.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 2: United States Embassy in Israel Cable from Samuel W.
Lewis to the Department of State. "Conversation with [Excised],"
December 12, 1980.
A source says Israel will refrain from selling arms to Iran while
Americans are held hostage in Tehran, but that European arms dealers
were providing it with weapons with or without government approval.
(Iranian demonstrators seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran in September
1979 to protest the admission of the exiled shah to the U.S. for
medical treatment, and held 52 Americans hostage. In response, the
Carter administration froze Iranian assets and imposed other
sanctions. The hostages were not released until January 20, 1981, the
inauguration day of newly elected President Ronald Reagan.)
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 3: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to
All Near Eastern and South Asian Diplomatic Posts. "Military
Equipment for Iran and Iraq," February 16, 1981.
A State Department cable delineates official U.S. arms export policy
for Iran and Iraq as it stood in early 1981: the "U.S. position has
been to avoid taking sides in an effort to prevent widening the
conflict, bring an end to the fighting and restore stability to the
area."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 4: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Prospects for
DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] Draper's Visit To Baghdad," April 4,
1981.
The U.S. interests section (since the U.S. and Iraq did not have
formal diplomatic relations at this time - they were restored in
November 1984 - they were represented in each other's capitol by
interests sections) says that the U.S. now has "a greater convergence
of interests with Iraq than at any time since the revolution of 1958"
(when Iraqis overthrew the conservative Hashemite monarchy that had
been imposed under British colonialism.) Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Morris Draper is to visit Baghdad, "the first visit by a
senior department official since Phil Habib stopped by in 1977."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 5: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to
the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Secretary's Message To
Iraqi Foreign Minister," April 8, 1981.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig sends a personal message to Iraqi
Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, noting that it is important
that "our two countries be able to exchange views, freely and on a
systematic basis," paving the way for Deputy Assistant Secretary
Morris Draper's meetings in Baghdad.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 6: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Meetings in
Baghdad with Foreign Minister Hammadi," April 12, 1981.
As the Reagan administration continues efforts to improve relations
with Iraq, the U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks for more
information from Washington "so as to be able to take up with the
Iraqis on suitable occasions a wide array of issues of mutual
interest."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 7: Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs Letter from Saadoun
Hammadi to Alexander M. Haig, Jr. [Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs
Praise for Visit of Under Secretary Draper], April 15, 1981.
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Saadoun Hammadi thanks Secretary
of State Alexander Haig for Under Secretary Draper's visit, supports
discussion of strengthened trade relations, and welcomes assurances
that the U.S. will not sell arms to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 8: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Letter to the
Secretary from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi," April 20, 1981.
After reading a "friendly and non-contentious letter" from Iraqi
Foreign Minister Hammadi to Secretary of State Haig, the head of the
U.S. interests section agrees with foreign ministry official Mohammed
al-Sahhaf that a useful two-way correspondence had been established
between the U.S. and Iraq.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 9: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to
the Iraqi Interests Section in the United States. "Meeting with
Iraqint Chief al-Omar" [For Eagleton from Draper], April 22, 1981.
Upon returning to Washington, Under Secretary Draper assures the head
of the Iraqi interests section that he was extremely pleased with his
visit to Baghdad and prospects for improved relations and increased
trade. He takes the opportunity to make a "strong pitch" for a U.S.
company bidding on an Iraqi Metro project.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 10: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to Department of State. "Meeting with Tariq
Aziz," May 28, 1981.
Following consultations in Washington, the head of the U.S. interests
section in Baghdad, William Eagleton, meets with Revolutionary
Command Council representative Tariq Aziz, the "highest level in the
Iraqi government our Baghdad mission has met with since the 1967
break in relations." Eagleton informs Aziz of "the U.S. government's
satisfaction with the positive trend in U.S.-Iraqi relations." After
the meeting, he tells Washington that "we are in a position to
communicate directly with the leadership should we have any sensitive
or particularly important message to convey."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 11: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to
the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Policy on Arms
Sales and Transfers to Iraq and Iran," June 3, 1981.
Washington tells the U.S. interests section in Baghdad that it "has
no specific information" regarding Iran's reported acquisitions of
U.S. arms and spare parts, and asks the interests section head to
assure Iraqi officials that "the U.S. has not approved nor condoned
any military sales to Iraq or Iran."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 12: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable to the
Department of State. "Staffdel [Staff Delegation] Pillsbury's Visit
to Baghdad," September 27, 1981.
A member of a staff delegation touring the Middle East on behalf of
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) visits Iraq's parliament, and has
discussions during which "the atmosphere was pleasant and friendly,"
reflected in expressions of support for improving U.S.-Iraqi
relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 13: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to
the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "De-designation of Iraq
as Supporter of International Terrorism," February 27, 1982.
The State Department provides press guidance to regional missions
regarding removal of Iraq from its list of countries that support
international terrorism. The guidance says that the decision has no
implications for U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 14: National Security Study Directive (NSSD 4-82) from
Ronald W. Reagan. "U.S. Strategy for the Near East and Southwest
Asia," March 19, 1982.
President Reagan calls for a review of policy for the Middle East and
South Asia, to prepare for decisions regarding procurement, arms
transfers, and intelligence planning. Revised guidelines are needed
because of regional diplomatic and global oil market developments.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 15: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of Commerce. "Helicopters
and Airplanes for Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform,"
September 20, 1982.
Iraq's director of agricultural aviation invites U.S. crop-spraying
aircraft manufacturers to provide information about helicopters and
pilot training, noting problems with its existing equipment because
pilots have been inhaling insecticide fumes.
Iran was reporting chemical weapons use against its forces by this
time. According to a 1991 article in the Los Angeles Times, American-
built helicopters were used by Iraq for some of its chemical weapons
attacks; according to the Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq
experimented with using commercial crop sprayers for biological
warfare.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 16: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the
United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Visit of Iraqi Foreign
Minister," January 15, 1983.
The State Department asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to
inform Iraqi officials that Secretary of State George Shultz would
welcome a visit by Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, but notes
congressional criticism of Iraq and the "sensitivity of the terrorism
issue" (Iraq supported several Palestinian nationalist factions.) The
department suggests Iraq "contribute to the positive atmosphere of
the visit" by curtailing its support for terrorism, mentioning
specifically the Palestinian groups Black June and May 15.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 17: Department of State, Office of the Secretary Delegation
Cable from George P. Shultz to the Department of State. "Secretary's
May 10 Meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz," May 11, 1983.
Secretary of State Shultz tells Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz
that the U.S. wants the Iran-Iraq war to end. He says that the U.S.
is neutral toward the war but observes that Aziz knows that "we had
been helpful to Iraq in various ways."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 18: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the
United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Message from the Secretary
for FON MIN Tariq Aziz: Iraqi Support for Terrorism," May 23, 1983.
Secretary of State George Shultz writes to Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz, commenting on the "very important common interests"
between Iraq and the U.S. Shultz obliquely encourages Iraq to
disassociate itself from the Palestinian groups it supports by
evoking conservative Shiite militants opposed to both the U.S. and to
Iraq's secular government: it "appears that at least the inspiration
for certain terrorist acts against Iraq and against the U.S. emanates
at times from the same sources. By working together to combat
terrorism, our efforts should be more effective. In observing Iraqi
policy, it had begun to appear to me that Iraq was approaching the
conclusion that its national interests are never served by
international terrorists."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 19: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence
Appraisal. "The Iraqi Nuclear Program: Progress Despite Setbacks,"
June 1983.
In its assessment of Iraq's nuclear program, the Central Intelligence
Agency indicates that Iraq probably plans to eventually obtain
nuclear weapons. The CIA says it has not identified such a program,
but remarks that Iraq "has made a few moves that could take it in
that direction," while noting the difficulty of clandestine research
and development and procurement of the necessary technology and
fissile materials.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 20: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
Barbara K. Bodine to the Department of State. "Militarization of
Hughes Helicopters," June 8, 1983.
Tells the State Department that a government official from
(presumably) South Korea reported that Iraq asked his government to
militarize Hughes helicopters that were sold and delivered earlier in
1983. The request was turned down.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 21: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 99) from
Ronald W. Reagan. "United States Security Strategy for the Near East
and South Asia" [Attached to Cover Memorandum; Heavily Excised], July
12, 1983.
Outlines U.S. regional objectives, strategies, and action plans for
the Middle East (most content is excised).
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 22: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to
Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S.
Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality," October 7, 1983.
Discusses the feasibility of a U.S. "tilt" toward Iraq in the Iran-
Iraq war and related practical concerns. The analysis notes that the
U.S. "policy of strict neutrality has already been modified, except
for arms sales, since Iran's forces crossed into Iraq in the summer
of 1982. (We assume that other actions not discussed here, such as
providing tactical intelligence, would continue as necessary.)"
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 23: Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Transcription. "IRNA Reports Iraqi Regime Using Chemical Weapons to
Stop Val-Fajr IV," October 22, 1983.
Iran says that Iraq has been using chemical weapons against Iranian
troops.
Document 24: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to George P.
Shultz. "Iraq Use of Chemical Weapons," November 1, 1983.
Officials from the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs tell Secretary Shultz that the department has additional
information confirming Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons.
They note, "We also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production
capability, presumably from Western firms, including possibly a U.S.
foreign subsidiary." The issue is to be added to the agenda for an
upcoming National Security Council meeting, at which measures to
assist Iraq are to be considered. The officials note that a response
is important in order to maintain the credibility of U.S. policy on
chemical warfare.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 25: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from
Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "Iraqi Use of Chemical
Weapons" [Includes Cables Entitled "Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical
Weapons" and "Background of Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons"], November
21, 1983.
State Department officials recommend discussing the use of chemical
weapons with Iraqi officials soon, in order to deter further use
and "to avoid unpleasantly surprising Iraq through public positions
we may have to take on this issue." A background cable says that Iraq
used lethal chemical weapons in October 1982 and, reportedly, against
Iranian forces July and August 1983 "and more recently against
Kurdish insurgents."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 26: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 114) from
Ronald W. Reagan. "U.S. Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War," November
26, 1983.
President Ronald Reagan directs that consultations begin with
regional states willing to cooperate with the U.S. on measures to
protect Persian Gulf oil production and its transshipment
infrastructure. The U.S. will give the highest priority to the
establishment of military facilities allowing for the positioning of
rapid deployment forces in the region to guard oil facilities.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 27: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to the
United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq,"
December 7, 1983.
Reports that Donald Rumsfeld wants to visit Iraq during his tour of
Middle Eastern countries as an envoy for President Reagan, but notes
that he does not think his visit will be worthwhile unless he meets
directly with Saddam Hussein.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 28: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State [et
al.]. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December 10, 1983.
The head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad tells Iraqi Under
Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf that "perhaps the greatest benefit" of
Donald Rumsfeld's upcoming visit to Baghdad "will be the
establishment of direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan
and President Saddam Hussein." The planned topics of discussion are
the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Syria, and any
other issues that the Iraqis might want to raise.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 29: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the United States Embassy in
Jordan. "Talking Points for Amb. [Ambassador] Rumsfeld's Meeting with
Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein," December 14, 1983.
A U.S. interests section cable notes that presidential envoy Donald
Rumsfeld's upcoming meeting will be Saddam Hussein's first with a
representative of the U.S. executive branch; therefore, a major goal
will be "to initiate a dialogue and establish personal rapport." In
the meeting, "Rumsfeld will want to emphasize his close relationship
with President Reagan . . ." Talking points for the meeting include
the Iran-Iraq war (the U.S. "would regard any major reversal of
Iraq's fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West"), expansion of
Iraqi pipeline facilities, Lebanon, Syria, strengthening of Egyptian
and Iraqi ties, and the threat of terrorism, which targets both
countries.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 30: United States Embassy in Italy Cable from Maxwell M.
Rabb to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld's Larger Meeting with
Iraqi Deputy PM [Prime Minister] and FM [Foreign Minister] Tariz
[Tariq] Aziz, December 19," December 20, 1983.
During a meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and other Iraqi
officials, Donald Rumsfeld notes that the U.S. and Iraq have both
differences and "a number of areas of common interest." Aziz says
that he was heartened by a line in President Reagan's letter to
Saddam Hussein stating, "The Iran-Iraq war could post serious
problems for the economic and security interests of the U.S., its
friends in the region and in the free world."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 31: United States Embassy in United Kingdom Cable from
Charles H. Price II to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld Mission:
December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein," December
21, 1983.
At a 90-minute meeting with Donald Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein
evinces "obvious pleasure" at a letter Rumsfeld brought from
President Ronald Reagan. The two discuss common U.S.-Iraqi interests,
including Lebanon, Palestine, opposition to an outcome of the Iran-
Iraq war that "weakened Iraq's role or enhanced interests and
ambitions of Iran," and U.S. efforts to cut off arms sales to Iran.
Rumsfeld says that the U.S. feels extremely strongly about terrorism
and says that it has a home - in Iran, Syria, and Libya, and that it
is supported by the Soviet Union. He encourages arrangements that
might provide alternative transshipment routes for Iraq's oil,
including pipelines through Saudi Arabia or to the Gulf of Aqaba in
Jordan. The State Department calls the meeting a "positive milestone."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 32: United States Embassy in the United Kingdom Cable from
Charles H. Price II to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld One-on-One
Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister," December 21, 1983.
Presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld and Tariq Aziz meet for two and
one-half hours and agree that "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common
interests," including peace in the Persian Gulf, the desire to
diminish the influence of Iran and Syria, and support for
reintegrating Egypt, isolated since its unilateral peace with Israel,
into the Arab world. Rumsfeld comments on Iraq's oil exports,
suggests alternative pipeline facilities, and discusses opposition to
international terrorism and support for a fair Arab-Israeli peace. He
and Aziz discuss the Iran-Iraq war "in detail." Rumsfeld says that
the administration wants an end to the war, and offers "our
willingness to do more." He mentions chemical weapons, possible
escalation of fighting in the Gulf, and human rights as impediments
to the U.S. government's desire to do more to help Iraq, then shifts
the conversation to U.S. opposition to Syria's role in Lebanon.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 33: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from
Richard W. Murphy to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "EXIM [Export-Import]
Bank Financing for Iraq" [Includes Letter From Lawrence S.
Eagleburger to William Draper, Dated December 24, 1983], December 22,
1983.
Pursuant to the Reagan administration's policy of increasing support
for Iraq, the State Department advises Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger to urge the U.S. Export-Import
Bank to provide Iraq with financial credits. Eagleburger signs a
letter to Eximbank saying that since Saddam Hussein had complied with
U.S. requests, and announced the end of all aid to the principal
terrorist group of concern to the U.S., and expelled its leader (Abu
Nidal), "The terrorism issue, therefore, should no longer be an
impediment to EXIM financing for U.S. sales to Iraq." The financing
is to signal U.S. belief in Iraq's future economic viability, secure
a foothold in the potentially large Iraqi market, and "go far to show
our support for Iraq in a practical, neutral context."
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 34: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to United
States Embassy in Jordan. "Rumsfeld Mission: Meeting with King
Hussein in London," December 23, 1983.
Ambassador-at-large and presidential emissary Donald Rumsfeld
discusses prospects for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations with King
Hussein of Jordan. Rumsfeld reports on his talks with Saddam Hussein
and Tariq Aziz and says they had "more areas of agreement than
disagreement." He also reviews the status of a proposed pipeline to
Aqaba for Iraq's oil.
The U.S. promoted the Aqaba pipeline project strenuously for several
years during the early to mid 1980s. It would have carried oil from
northern Iraq to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan, alleviating the
disruptive effect on Iraq's oil output that resulted from Iran's
attacks on oil transshipment facilities in the Persian Gulf and from
Syria's closing of a pipeline that had transported Iraqi oil. The
proposed project reflected the U.S.'s extreme nervousness about
threats to the world oil supply resulting from the Iran-Iraq war.
The U.S. involved several U.S.-based multinational corporations in
planning the project. International financier Bruce Rappaport, a
friend of CIA director William Casey, was also a central figure in
the proposed deal. (The final report of the independent counsel for
the Iran-Contra "arms for hostages" scandal cites reports indicating
that Rappaport's bank in Geneva was the recipient of a mysterious $10
million payment from the Sultan of Brunei to fund the Nicaraguan
contras that subsequently disappeared. Rappaport denied this; the
final report says that the issue remained unresolved. He was invited
to testify in 1999 at a House Banking committee hearing on corruption
in Russian financial transactions, but declined.) The project was
complicated by demands that the U.S. arrange for ironclad security
guarantees from the Israelis, since the pipeline would have been
vulnerable to their attack. The Israelis, for their part, demanded
guarantees that pipeline facilities would not cause environmental
damage.
All involved had their reasons for at least hypothetical interest in
the project. For Iraq, it would have been a manifestation of improved
U.S.-Iraq relations - they wanted as much U.S. financial and other
involvement in the proposed deal as possible. For the U.S., it would
have provided an alternative, theoretically secure outlet for oil and
created a nexus for entangling Iraqi interests with those of Jordan
and Israel, consistent with U.S. plans to create a wider consortium
of Arab countries that would cooperate with the U.S. and would be
willing to resolve the Palestine-Israel dispute on U.S. terms. Israel
would have benefited from new oil facilities in its vicinity, and won
points with the Reagan administration. Also, according to internal
documents from a friend of Reagan administration Attorney General
Edmund Meese, brought in as an intermediary because of his Israeli
ties, payoffs would have been skimmed from complex financial
guarantee arrangements for the Israeli government and Labor Party.
Attempts to agree on arrangements that would satisfy all parties
dragged on, until the several private companies that had been brought
in to plan the project backed out, questioning the motives of all
involved. Iraq, however, revived the concept in 2000, presumably for
its own strategic interests.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 35: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Follow-up on
Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad," December 26, 1983.
William Eagleton meets with Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf
to follow up on Donald Rumsfeld's visit. Eagleton discusses U.S.
efforts to coordinate policy toward the Iran-Iraq war among Persian
Gulf states, its campaign to stop arms sales to Iran, and its wish to
see Iraq's oil exports increase. He informs the Iraqi official of the
degree of U.S. interest in Iraq's economic situation, mentioning
the "high level policy review which had established the environment
and policy positions that had been conveyed to the Iraqi leadership
by Ambassador Rumsfeld."
Eagleton comments, "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has elevated U.S.-
Iraqi relations to a new level. This is both symbolically important
and practically helpful."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 36: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Meeting With
Tariq Aziz: Expanding Iraq's Oil Export Facilities," January 3, 1984.
During a meeting following Donald Rumsfeld's talks, Tariq Aziz tells
William Eagleton that President Saddam Hussein was pleased with the
visit and with the positive atmosphere it created.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 37: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "[Excised] Iraqi
Pipeline through Jordan," January 10, 1984.
The head of the U.S. interests section tells Washington, "the Iraqi
leadership was extremely pleased with Amb. Rumsfeld's visit. Tariq
Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person . . ."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 38: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the
United States Consulate General, Jerusalem. "Follow-up Steps on Iraq-
Iran" [Includes Transmittal Sheet], January 14, 1984.
The U.S. intensifies its diplomatic efforts to curtail arms sales to
Iran and imposes anti-terrorism export controls on that country.
However, it does not plan to prohibit U.S. imports of Iranian oil.
The U.S. was developing plans to liberalize its export policy for
Iraq. The revised rules would permit the export of U.S.-origin
armored ambulances, communications gear, and electronic equipment for
the protection of Saddam Hussein's personal aircraft. The Reagan
administration was continuing efforts to persuade the Export-Import
Bank to provide financing for Iraq -- a positive Eximbank
determination would improve Iraq's credit rating and make it easier
for it to obtain loans from international financial institutions.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 39: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from David
T. Schneider to George P. Shultz. "Easing Restrictions on Exports to
Iraq," January 30, 1984.
The State Department presents the case for relaxing controls on
exports to Iraq of militarily useful items. The department is
concerned specifically with an application to export dual-use heavy
trucks, the sale of which to either Iran or Iraq has been banned
under the Export Administration Act. Secretary of State Shultz
approves the proposed sale.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 40: Export-Import Bank of the United States, Country Risk
Analysis Division Memorandum to the Export-Import Bank of the United
States, Africa and Middle East Division, Board of Directors. "Country
Review and Recommendations for Eximbank's Programs" [Extract;
Includes Document Entitled "Appendix I: Iraq"], February 21, 1984.
The Export-Import Bank considers Iraq a bad credit risk because of
its very high level of indebtedness and the uncertainty created by
the Iran-Iraq war. An appendix lists U.S. companies that would be
potential exporters to Iraq if credits were available, including
Westinghouse, General Electric, Bechtel, and Halliburton.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 41: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Iraqi Warning
re Iranian Offensive," February 22, 1984.
Between presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld's two visits to Iraq to
seek ways to improve U.S.-Iraq relations and to identify measures to
assist Iraq's war efforts, the Iraqi military issues a statement
declaring that "the invaders should know that for every harmful
insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever
their number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 42: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the
United States Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Chemical Shipment to
Iraq," March 4, 1984.
Indicates that a shipment of 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride to
Iraq was held back at JFK airport because of "concern over Iraq's
possible intention to use the chemical in the manufacture of chemical
weapons." Washington asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to
remind Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.'s grave concern
about chemical weapons, and to inform it that the U.S. will publicly
condemn their use in the near future. The interests section is to
reiterate the request that Iraq not use chemical warfare, and to say
that the U.S. opposes Iraq's attempts to acquire chemical weapons
related material from the U.S.: "When we become aware of attempts to
do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 43: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs Memorandum from James A. Placke to James M. Ealum [et
al.]. [U.S. Condemnation of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Use], March 4,
1984.
The State Department circulates for review a draft press statement
and guidance for a U.S. condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical
weapons. The statement says that "While condemning Iraq's chemical
weapons use . . . . The United States finds the present Iranian
regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of
eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be
inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and
the moral and religious basis which it claims."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 44: Department of State Memorandum. "Notifying Congress of
[Excised] Truck Sale," March 5, 1984.
The State Department informs a House Committee on Foreign Affairs
staff member that the department has not objected to the sale of
2,000 heavy trucks to Iraq, noting that they were built in part in
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan. The
official policy of the U.S. is that it does not export military
related items to Iraq or Iran. When asked if the trucks were intended
for military purposes, the official responds, "we presumed that this
was Iraq's intention, and had not asked."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 45: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from
William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Iraq Reacts
Angrily to U.S. Condemnation of CW [Chemical Weapons] Use," March 7,
1984.
Reports that Iraq's defense minister denounced the State Department's
condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. interests
section comments that "The Iraqis apparently have been stunned by our
public condemnation."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 46: United States Embassy in Austria Cable from Helene A.
von Damm to the Department of State. "Iranian War Wounded in Vienna,"
March 13, 1984.
The U.S. embassy in Austria tells the State Department that a Belgian
laboratory found residual amounts of mustard gas and mycotoxin in the
blood of Iranian war casualties brought to Vienna for medical
treatment.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 47: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the
Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other
International Organizations. "U.N. Human Rights Commission: Item 12:
Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq," March 14,
1984.
The State Department instructs the U.S. delegate to the United
Nations to get the support of other Western missions for a motion
of "no decision" regarding Iran's draft resolution condemning Iraq's
use of chemical weapons. Failing that, the U.S. is to abstain on the
resolution.
The U.S. is to emphasize points made in a recent State Department
press conference, including the assertion that "The USG evenhandedly
condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons whenever it occurs."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 48: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the
United States Embassy in Sudan. "Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to
Baghdad [Page Missing]," March 24, 1984.
A State Department background cable for Donald Rumsfeld's March 1984
visit to Baghdad notes the distress caused to Iraqi officials by the
U.S.'s public condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons "despite
our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later."
Most of the cable is concerned with the Reagan administration's
interest in reassuring Iraqi officials that U.S. financing might be
available for the proposed pipeline to deliver Iraqi oil to Aqaba,
and other U.S. regional interests. The cable notes that Iraqi
officials are "confused" by the administration's "means of pursuing
our stated objectives in the region."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 49: United States Embassy in Bahrain Cable from Donald
Charles Seidel to the Department of State. "Middle East Mission: U.S.
Efforts to Stop Arms Transfers to Iran," March 24, 1984.
In preparation for his second round of meetings with officials in
Baghdad, Donald Rumsfeld asks for a list of the countries that the
U.S. has approached in order to persuade them to cut off arms sales
to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 50: Mission to the United Nations Cable from Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick to the Department of State. "U.N. Report on Chemical
Weapons Use in Iran/Iraq War: Consideration in Security Council,"
March 28, 1984.
Reports British and Dutch efforts to draft a quick United Nations
resolution condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq
war, describes evidence regarding Iraqi chemical weapons use, and
passes on the observation by a U.N. official that "Iranians may well
decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if
international community does not condemn Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 51: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs Cover Memorandum from Allen Overmyer to James A.
Placke. [United Nations Security Council Response to Iranian Chemical
Weapons Complaint; Includes Revised Working Paper], March 30, 1984.
Reports that the U.N. Security Council decided to adopt the text of a
draft Dutch resolution on chemical weapons and issue it as a
presidential statement. "The statement, by the way, contains all
three elements Hamdoon wanted."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 52: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the
United States Embassy in Lebanon [et al.]. "Department Press
Briefing, March 30, 1984," March 31, 1984.
The State Department announces it has imposed foreign policy controls
on Iran and Iraq for exports of chemical weapons precursors. It
responds to questions from the press about U.S. policy regarding the
Iran-Iraq war, and a department spokesperson says Iraq's chemical
weapons use will not change U.S. interest in pursuing closer U.S.-
Iraq relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 53: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 139) from
Ronald W. Reagan. "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to
Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War," April 5, 1984.
Ronald Reagan says that action must be taken to increase U.S.
military capabilities and "intelligence collection posture" in the
Persian Gulf. Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger, and Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey are
to prepare a plan to prevent Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war.
Reagan directs Shultz to ensure that the U.S. government's
condemnation of the use of chemical weapons is unambiguous, while
placing "equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from
continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized
recent offensives."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 54: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to
United States Embassy in Jordan. "Chemical Weapons: Meeting With
Iraqi Charge," April 6, 1984.
Reports that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke
discussed a draft United Nations' resolution on chemical weapons use
in the Iran-Iraq war with Iraqi interests section representative
Nizar Hamdoon on March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq would prefer a
Security Council presidential statement to a resolution. Placke
indicated that the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals regarding points
that should be included in the resolution if the Security Council
approves them. He said that the U.S. would like the Iraqi
government's cooperation "in avoiding situations that would lead to
difficult and possibly embarrassing situation[s]" regarding chemical
weapons use, but noted that the U.S. did "not want this issue to
dominate our bilateral relationship nor to detract from our common
interest to see war brought to [an] early end."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 55: United States Interests Section. Iraq Cable from William
L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Bell Discusses Possible
Helicopter Sale to Iraq," April 12, 1984.
The U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks to be kept apprised of
developments in ongoing talks between Iraq and Bell Helicopter
Textron about its sale of helicopters to Iraq's Ministry of Defense
that "can not be in any way configured for military use."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 56: Letter from Richard M. Nixon to Nicolae Ceausescu.
[Regarding U.S.-Romanian Venture to Sell Uniforms to Iraq], May 3,
1984.
Former president Richard Nixon sends a letter to Romanian President
Nicolae Ceausescu in support of a deal made by Colonel John Brennan,
his former aide and chief of staff, and former attorney general John
Mitchell, to buy Romanian-manufactured military uniforms for export
to Iraq.
Media and criminal investigations of U.S. companies that had exported
weapons-related or dual-use items to Iraq were conducted after Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. Many of these companies seemed to have
connections with former U.S. government officials.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 57: Department of State, Special Adviser to the Secretary on
Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs Memorandum from
Dick Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy. "U.S. Dual-Use Exports to Iraq:
Specific Actions" [Includes Document Entitled "Dual Use Exports to
Iraq" Dated April 27, 1984], May 9, 1984.
An internal State Department paper indicates that the government is
reviewing policy for "the sale of certain categories of dual-use
items to Iraqi nuclear entities," and the review's "preliminary
results favor expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities."
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 58: Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence
Report. "Defense Estimative Brief: Prospects for Iraq," September 25,
1984.
The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses political, economic, and
military conditions in Iraq, predicts that it will continue to
develop its conventional and "formidable" chemical capabilities, and
will "probably pursue nuclear weapons." It says that Iraq is unlikely
to use chemical weapons against Israel because of certain Israeli
retaliation, and that U.S.-Iraqi relations will hinge on U.S. policy
toward the Middle East, including its aid for Iraq.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 59: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Briefing Paper. "Iraqi Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons," November 16,
1984.
Indicates that the U.S. concluded some time ago that Iraq had
used "domestically produced lethal CW" in the Iran-Iraq war,
developed in part through "the unwitting and, in some cases, we
believe witting assistance" of numerous Western firms. The State
Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs thinks that Iraq
stopped using chemical weapons in response to a U.S. demarche in
November 1983, and resumed their use in February 1984.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation
Document 60: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the
United States Embassy in Iraq. "Memcon [Memorandum of Conversation]:
Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi DepPrimMin [Deputy Prime Minister]
Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984, 10:00 a.m.," November 29, 1984.
Following the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between the
U.S. and Iraq, George Shultz meets with Tariq Aziz and
emphasizes "the U.S. desire to base these relations on the
presumption of equality, mutual respect, and reciprocity." After Aziz
says that Iraq's advantage in weaponry was enabling it to defend
itself against Iran, Secretary Shultz comments "that superior
intelligence also must be an important factor in Iraq's defense. Aziz
acknowledged that this may be true." (The U.S. had been secretly
providing Iraq with extensive intelligence support for several
years.) Secretary Shultz concludes by welcoming the candor of the
ongoing U.S.-Iraq dialogue, and remarks that "Iraq can expect the
U.S. to maintain its opposition to both the use and production of
chemical weapons. This position is not directed specifically at
Iraq . . . "
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 61: United States District Court (Florida: Southern
District) Affidavit. "United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Carlos
Cardoen [et al.]" [Charge that Teledyne Wah Chang Albany Illegally
Provided a Proscribed Substance, Zirconium, to Cardoen Industries and
to Iraq], January 31, 1995.
Former Reagan administration National Security Council staff member
Howard Teicher says that after Ronald Reagan signed a national
security decision directive calling for the U.S. to do whatever was
necessary to prevent Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war, Director of
Central Intelligence William Casey personally led efforts to ensure
that Iraq had sufficient weapons, including cluster bombs, and that
the U.S. provided Iraq with financial credits, intelligence, and
strategic military advice. The CIA also provided Iraq, through third
parties that included Israel and Egypt, with military hardware
compatible with its Soviet-origin weaponry.
This affidavit was submitted in the course of one of a number of
prosecutions, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, of U.S. companies
charged with illegally delivering military, dual-use, or nuclear-
related items to Iraq. (In this case, a Teledyne affiliate was
charged will illegally selling zirconium, used in the manufacture of
explosives, to the Chilean arms manufacturer Carlos Industries, which
used the material to manufacture cluster bombs sold to Iraq.) Many of
these firms tried to defend themselves by establishing that providing
military materiel to Iraq had been the actual, if covert, policy of
the U.S. government. This was a difficult case to make, especially
considering the rules of evidence governing investigations involving
national security matters.
Source: Court case
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Notes
1. <http://ednet.rvc.cc.il.us/~PeterR/IR/docs/Geneva.htm>
2. <http://www.cjr.org/year/93/2/iraqgate.asp>
3.
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/iraqgate/iraqgate.html>
; <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/introx.htm>
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