9/11

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Pieczenik
Excerpt:
Professional life
Pieczenik was deputy assistant secretary of state under Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance and James Baker.^[3] His expertise includes foreign policy, international crisis management and psychological warfare.^[7] He served the presidential administrations of Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush in the capacity of deputy assistant secretary.^[8]
In 1974, Pieczenik joined the U.S. State Department as a consultant to restructure its Office for the Prevention of Terrorism.^[2]
In 1976, Pieczenik was made deputy assistant secretary of state for management.^{[2][5][9][10]}

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9556
Excerpt:
Kissinger’s ThreatMoro was held for 55 days before his eventual murder. The reasoning was for his plan to bring the Communist Party into the government. Four years prior to his death, in 1974, Moro was on a visit as Italian Prime Minister, to the United States. While there, he met with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who told Moro, “`You must abandon your policy of bringing all the political forces in your country into direct collaboration... or you will pay dearly for it.”[13]

Moro was “Sacrificed”

Steve Pieczenik, a former State Department hostage negotiator and international crisis manager, “claimed that he played a critical role in the fate of Aldo Moro.” Pieczenik “said that Moro had been "sacrificed" for the "stability" of Italy.” He had been sent to Italy by President Jimmy Carter on the day of Moro’s kidnapping to be part of a crisis committee, of which he said was “jolted into action by the fear that Moro would reveal state secrets in an attempt to free himself.” The action the committee took was to leak a memo saying that Moro was dead, and to have the memo attributed to the Red Brigades. The purpose of this was to “prepare the Italian public for the worst and to let the Red Brigades know that the state would not negotiate for Moro, and considered him already dead.”[14] In a documentary on the subject, Pieczenik stated that, “The decision was made in the fourth week of the kidnapping, when Moro's letters became desperate and he was about to reveal state secrets,” and that, “It was an extremely difficult decision, but the one who made it in the end was interior minister Francesco Cossiga, and, apparently, also prime minister Giulio Andreotti.”[15]